The Dark History of HathiTrust by Centivany, Alissa
The Dark History of HathiTrust 
 
Alissa Centivany 
Faculty of Information & Media Studies 
Western University 







This research explores the ways values, power, 
and politics shape and are shaped by digital 
infrastructure development through an in-depth study 
of HathiTrust’s “dark history,” the period of years 
leading up to its public launch.  This research 
identifies and traces the emerging and iterative ways 
that values were surfaced and negotiated, decision-
making approaches were strategically modified, and 
relationships were strengthened, reconfigured, and 
sometimes abandoning through the process of 
generating a viable, robust and sustainable 
collaborative digital infrastructure.  Through this 
history, we gain deeper understandings and 
appreciations of the various and sometimes 
surprising ways that values, power, and politics are 
implicated in digital infrastructure development.  
Shedding light on this history enables us to better 
contextualize and understand the affordances, 
limitations, and challenges of the HathiTrust we 
know today, better envision its range of possible 
futures, and develop richer appreciations for digital 
infrastructure development more broadly.     
 
1. Introduction  
 
Digital infrastructure (“DI”) undergirds the 
platforms, applications, tools, and systems that are 
increasingly ubiquitous, indispensable, and 
inseparable parts of life.  In contrast to the more 
public-facing interfaces they support, DI operates 
beneath the surface, collecting, organizing, and 
processing data in ways that are difficult to observe 
and, in many cases, understand and critically 
evaluate.   
This work contributes to understandings of the 
roles of values, power and politics in DI development 
through a qualitative study of HathiTrust (“HT”).  In 
2008, HT was introduced to the public as a shared 
digital repository (“SDR”) jointly launched by the 
twelve-university consortium known as the 
Committee on Institutional Cooperation (“CIC”) and 
the eleven university libraries of the University of 
California System [9].  Emphasizing shared values 
around information preservation and access and 
shared traditions around institutional cooperation, HT 
sought to combine, coordinate and leverage the 
distributed, independent digitization efforts of its 
members in the creation of a new DI supporting the 
“collective collection.”  In the eight years that have 
passed since its launch, HT has evolved far beyond 
these origins.  Today, HT has over one hundred 
institutional partners working cooperatively to sustain 
and innovate on a DI supporting a growing corpus 
that, as of this writing, contains over fourteen million 
digitized print volumes.   
These snapshots of HT do not, however, reflect or 
reveal much about how or why it came to be or came 
to become this HT.  This research describes some of 
these processes through a telling of HT’s “dark 
history”— the years HT’s progenitors spent behind 
closed doors gestating the digital infrastructure.  As 
with DI development more generally, HT emerged 
through iterative negotiations, demonstrations and 
challenges of power, and political posturing and 
participation.  Through this history, we gain deeper 
understandings and appreciations of the various and 
sometimes surprising ways that values, power, and 
politics shape and are shaped by technical, social, and 
legal/policy concerns in DI development.  Shedding 
light on this history enables us to better contextualize 
and understand the affordances, limitations, and 
challenges of the HT we know today and better 
envision its range of possible futures.     
This paper begins by reviewing relevant prior 
work, drawing primarily on digital infrastructure, 
digitization and digital library literatures and 
describing the research methods used.  Focus then 
shifts to HT’s emergence, organized around three key 
moments or turning points in its development where 
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the interplay of values, power and politics proved 
determinative in the outcome:  (1) the decision to join 
Google’s mass digitization project (“MDP”), (2) 
developing the initial digital infrastructure that would 
become the technical backbone of HT, and (3) 
fleshing out the social and political dimensions of HT 
as a semi-autonomous collective organization 
operating beneath a persistent partial institutional 
umbrella.  The paper concludes by reflecting on the 
spectrum of ways values, power and politics 
influenced the emergence and evolution of HT and 
briefly noting possible implications for HTs future 
and the future of digital infrastructures more broadly.  
 
2. Related Literature 
 
This research draws upon digital infrastructure, 
digitization, library and information science, and 
organizational sensemaking literatures.  In 
combination, this prior work offers helpful insights 
into current understandings of DI in the library 
digitization and signals potential gaps in 
understandings with regard to the roles of values, 
power and politics. 
Sociotechnical systems and infrastructure 
literatures provide an overarching guiding 
perspective for this research.  The work of Hughes 
[13] and Bijker [1] are instructive in their emphasis 
on the social construction of technology and the in-
depth descriptive methods used to tease out and 
foreground the multidimensional, dynamic, and 
mutually constitutive web of role of values, power 
and politics in infrastructure development.  Echoing 
observations made by Kling [16], Edwards and 
colleagues hone in on some of the particular 
challenges and tensions slow-moving, self-preserving 
institutions like libraries face when they attempt to 
translate their deeply engrained traditions, practices, 
and values to a new digital environment: 
“Transformative infrastructures cannot merely be 
technical; they must engage fundamental changes in 
our social institutions, practices, norms and beliefs as 
well” [6:13].  The work of Star [19], Ribes [18], 
Bowker [2] and others offer insights useful for 
conceptualizing scale — in terms of size, time and 
zone of influence — in studies of infrastructure 
development, reminding us that DI like HT do not 
spring up as de novo fully fleshed forms but rather 
draw upon and interoperate with much older 
information and communication practices, norms, 
and technologies and therefore their study demands 
sensitivity to the “long now” of DI development.  
 Law, library and information science have also 
explored important aspects of DIs including, most 
notably, risks and affordances of large-scale 
digitization efforts (e.g. Google’s MDP) and 
associated public interest and social justice 
implications.  For example, Vaidhyanathan discussed 
potential of the MDP in light of a copyright 
disequilibrium wrought by new digital technologies 
and hypothesized that a hasty over-reliance on fair 
use would not only risk derailing the MDP but could 
significantly undermine future library digitization 
efforts as well [21, 22].  Grimmelmann has written 
extensively on the (ultimately unsuccessful) Google 
Books Settlement and the dangers associated with 
concentration in the market for digital access to print 
materials particularly when much of the material is 
out-of-print [7, 8].  Numerous library and information 
science studies have sought to position Google and 
library digitization projects in relation to each other 
using a variety of values and metrics.  Problems and 
challenges associated with quality, integrity, and 
access have been addressed in the context of meta-
data, preservation, and search [3, 4, 5, 22].  Citing the 
overwhelming discourse and rhetoric about the 
relative “open vs. closed” nature of many digitization 
projects, Leetaru undertook a comparative analysis of 
the digitization efforts of Google and the Open 
Content Alliance finding, in practice, that distinctions 
between open and closed may be more superficial 
than commonly assumed [17]. Noting the power of 
knowledge infrastructures to differentially shape, 
generate and distribute knowledge and justice, 
Hoffman has conducted a number of studies that 
describe and critique the MDP on the basis of its 
negative implications for gender equality and 
concerns around self-respect, finding that these 
interests had been promoted by traditional library 
practices but did not appear to receive adequate 
support or protection under Google. [10, 11, 12].   
Although he did not address digitization or 
libraries specifically, Weick’s work on organizational 
sensemaking processes provides both theoretical and 
methodological guidance for identifying and making 
sense of the ways that values, power and politics 
factor into the social construction of digitization and 
DI [23, 24].  Weick stresses, for example, that 
sensemaking is the primary site where meanings 
materialize that inform and constrain organizational 
identity and action [23].  In particular, important 
linkages are drawn between action (what Weick calls 
“behavioral commitments”) and processes of post-
hoc rationalization and justification.  Decision-
making and sensemaking are entangled in dynamic 
and continuously evolving processes of social 
interaction that, over time, become more ordered, 
stable, and resilient to criticism.  Jones elucidated 
many of these processes in the context of libraries 
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and library digitization noting, in particular, the 
importance of naiveté in jump-starting difficult 
projects and the eventual, almost centripetal return to 
domain expertise as a means of bringing the projects 
to fruition and (back) into alignment with traditional 
library goals, values, practices, and expectations [14, 
15].   
Informed by these rich and synergistic literatures, 
this study describes the various way that values, 
power, and politics shaped and were shaped by the 
emergence of HT filling some of the existing gaps in 
understanding by providing detailed descriptive 





This research seeks to contribute to 
understandings of the ways that values, power, and 
politics shape and are shaped by emerging DI 
through a qualitative study of HT’s emergence and 
evolution.  The primary data for this study were 
generated from in-depth semi-structured interviews 
with individuals involved in HathiTrust’s 
development.  In total, thirty-two participants were 
interviewed for this study representing sixteen 
difference institutional/organizational affiliations.  
The majority of participants were directly involved in 
HT but several individuals with competing and/or 
marginalized interests were also interviewed as were 
outside individuals with expertise on digitization and 
copyright law but no formal association with HT.  
Across the different institutions represented, 
participants’ roles varied and included: current and 
former university provosts, university librarians, 
chief information officers, librarians and staff, and 
advisors, employees, and/or members of HT.   
Data coding and analysis followed an iterative, 
inductive approach.  As patterns and themes emerged 
from the data, interview questions were refined to 
reflect new considerations and points of possible 
controversy.  A process of member checking was 
used to further test emerging theories, ensure high-
quality reporting, and reorganize and refine themes, 
patterns, and findings as they emerged.  Findings of 
this study are organized as a diachronic narrative 
using a storytelling approach.  Key observations and 
analytic reflections are interwoven into the 
description rather than pulled out as a separate 
discussion section.  The concluding section of this 
paper does, however, briefly summarize and 
synthesize key findings.  
 
4. The Dark History of HathiTrust  
The story of HT’s emergence is organized around 
three key moments or turning points:  (1) the 
University of Michigan’s (“UM”) decision to join the 
Google’s MDP, (2) developing the initial digital 
infrastructure that would become the backbone of 
HathiTrust, and (3) fleshing out the organizational 
and institutional aspects of HathiTrust prior to its 
launch.  Each turning point is discussed in turn. 
 
 4.1. UM-Google Partnership 
 
One of the ways the law gets changed is that it 
gets broken.   
–co-creator of HT 
                              
Although its official launch was not until the fall 
of 2008, HT’s origin story began many years earlier 
when, during a visit to his alma mater in 2002, 
Google co-founder Larry Page met with librarians at 
UM to discuss a possible joint digitization venture.  
From the start, the MDP was deeply contentious.  
Murmurings of the project sparked wild speculation, 
vehement commentary, and strident debate amongst a 
variety of stakeholders.  Objections were levied on 
the basis of copyright law and policy, economic 
grounds, access and quality of information issues, 
how the project might affect traditional library values 
and practices, and myriad social justice concerns.  
Given this background context, a reasonable jumping 
off point might be to ask:  How does a traditionally 
risk averse institution like UM decide to undertake 
such a politically risky, potentially costly, and legally 
precarious activity as digitizing its entire (roughly six 
million volume) print library? Several key patterns of 
justifications emerged through the interviews 
conducted for this study.   
 
4.1.1. Digitization is inevitable. Mass digitization 
was not seen as a goal but a given.  Participants were 
not grappling with if but rather when and how digital 
conversion of the print library would happen. One of 
the librarians at UM explained, “For libraries and 
librarians it’s as if digitization is written into our 
DNA.  It is what we have to do.”   
This technological determinism was widespread 
amongst many in the research library community but 
it was not universally adopted by the broader 
community of stakeholders.  For example, some were 
concerned that projects like the MDP might 
undermine the livelihood of authors and damage the 
knowledge economy.  Well-respected research has 
lent credence to the tendency and associated risks of 
conflating technological progress with progress more 
generally, particularly when a new technology seems 
to ignore or fail to accommodate key aspects of the 
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social environment in which it operates [16]. When 
there is a mismatch or imbalance between 
technological change, social norms, and shared 
expectations and practices, technological “progress” 
can have a paradoxically deleterious effect on 
existing social relations and structures.   
By in large, decision-makers at UM did not find 
those sorts of arguments compelling.  A key 
administrator at UM who played a central role in 
forging the UM-Google partnership explained:   
The fact that the Google Library Project causes 
some people to grow concerned about their 
livelihood is ultimately a moral argument, not an 
economic one.   
Concerns that mass digitization would undermine 
existing business models that have enabled some 
members of the literary and publishing world to 
flourish economically was not, without more, a 
compelling justification for resisting change.  
 
4.1.2. Digitization is moral.  While the purported 
moral arguments in support of preserving the status 
quo were dismissed as invalid bases for rejecting the 
MDP, a moral argument of a different sort was 
advanced as a justification for the decision to join the 
MDP.  Several HT progenitors reflected on the 
“strong belief in the inherent rightness” of digitizing 
books so they might become more accessible to 
society.  In addition, participants emphasized a 
utilitarian justification saying that, as a matter of 
principle, we should not permit the interests of the 
few to hold back the progress of society as a whole 
simply because they feel entitled to, have grown 
accustomed to, or have become dependent on the 
continued enjoyment of the benefits that accrued to 
them under an old or outdated regime.  UM’s Chief 
Librarian explained: 
Goddammit, I want there to be a mechanism 
where almost everybody in the world has access to 
almost everything that has ever been published in 
electronic form at zero marginal cost, perhaps with 
some subscription fee, but a fairly small one.  That is 
what I think the world ought to look like.  For 
academic work, I think that marginal cost and the 
subscription fee should probably both be zero.  The 
Google project showed me a feasible path to get 
there, not a complete path, but the starting point. 
Let's digitize a whole bunch of stuff so that all that 
prevents it from being available in the way I'd like it 
to be available is law and custom. I was optimistic 
that if we, as a society, have valuable assets, then we, 
as a society, will figure out how to use them.  That 
was the utopian goal. 
These sentiments reflect a shared ideology and set 
of core values held by key decision makers at UM 
that drove the decision to join the MDP.  
 
4.1.3. Joining the MDP is pragmatic.  Large-scale 
digitization efforts had been undertaken long before 
the MDP but these efforts were often plagued by a 
host of recurring challenges.  In particular, projects 
were often swallowed by constant budgetary 
pressures and the endless creep of technological 
obsolescence.  By offering to cover virtually all of 
the costs, complete the project on an extremely fast 
timeline, and provide some technical reassurances in 
the form of batch updates and other modest 
maintenance support Google’s proposal ameliorated 
many of these legacy challenges.   
Partnering with Google had pragmatic appeal but 
HTs progenitors were not convinced that the MDP 
would succeed.  In fact, it was not obvious at the 
outset what “success” even meant.  A co-creator of 
HT recalled: 
We didn’t have everything all figured out from the 
get-go.  We knew that this was a great opportunity 
and we wanted to seize it but we weren’t exactly sure 
what we were going to end up doing with the scans. 
Google’s financial and technological support, and 
its engineering throughput, was a leap in the right 
direction.  With a long history of stalled and failed 
digitization projects fading in the rearview, 
participants appreciated the pragmatic appeal of a 
partnership with Google.  Google might not 
guarantee success, whatever that might mean, but it 
might effectively ensure that this digitization project 
grows too big to fail.  
 
4.1.4. Joining the MDP adds reputational value.  
UM’s decision to partner with Google was also 
motivated by a sense that doing so would add 
reputational value to the institution and, by proxy, to 
the state.  A senior administrator involved in 
negotiating the UM-Google agreement said:  
There was a very strong feeling of Michigan 
exceptionalism on the part of key players that this is 
the kind of thing that Michigan does and we should 
do it.  The bravery of UM’s President was really 
laudable.  I don’t know whether she herself really 
thought it through but she was basically unafraid.  
The digitization project resonated with her.  It was a 
risk she was willing to take.  She said, ‘We’re going 
to go ahead and do this.  We’re going to partner with 
Google.  We’re going to scan all these books.  We’re 
going to create this thing.’ If you were trying to 
identify a signature of her presidency, I think this is 
it. 
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Partnership with Google, one of the world’s most 
dynamic and innovative companies, bolstered UM’s 
sense of exceptionalism and fed into its unique role 
and position vis-à-vis the economic well-being of the 
State.  
 
4.1.5. Joining the MDP as a form of advocacy. The 
decision to join the MDP was also an exercise of 
advocacy around copyright law and policy.  A senior 
administrator during the Google negotiations who 
now heads an academic research library said: 
I argued in favor of partnering with Google 
because it was a move that would force theories. 
Either people would be silent about it and they would 
be okay with it or it would force a fair use case that 
would be on favorable terms for us, assuming we did 
it right.  I remember being very concerned that we 
either use fair use or we lose it.  We were looking at 
the question prospectively rather than just reactively.  
Short of licensing something, there is no way to 
guarantee you won’t become a test case for fair use. 
The only way that you can determine that your use 
was, in fact, definitively a fair use, is to have a judge 
tell you that.  Part of the challenge around copyright 
cases is, for the most part, publishers pick cases that 
they think they will win, and then use those decisions 
to narrow the scope of fair use.  And the Google 
Library Project felt to me, at least intuitively, like … 
Man, if we're going to have a discussion about fair 
use then this is the project to have a discussion of fair 
use around. 
A co-creator of HT shared in that sentiment: 
This is probably the showdown that we’ve all 
known had to happen.  And if we lose, it’s not over.  
And if we win, it probably is over.  I didn’t ever hear 
it said but I think there were quite a few people who 
thought that this is the last chance for people who are 
really opposed to us digitizing the stuff at all to 
prohibit us from doing that. 
As a land grant institution, UM would likely enjoy 
some immunity against monetary damages for 
copyright infringement but those protections did not 
weigh heavily on the decision of whether or not to 
partner with Google.  A senior administrator said:   
We wanted to have the fight on the terms of the 
fight not because we have sovereign immunity and 
can’t be held liable for infringement.  Sovereign 
immunity really served as a safety valve.  In the event 
that everything went down in flames at least they 
couldn’t get damages.       
The potential copyright risks dissuaded a number 
of institutions from joining the MDP and, of those 
that did join, the majority avoided digitizing works 
well-within copyright.  By contrast UM adopted an 
aggressive approach, digitizing its entire library; 
roughly two-thirds of its approximately six million 
volume collection was believed to be in-copyright.  
This choice was partially motivated by a desire to 
advocate for fair use on behalf of libraries and library 
digitization efforts. 
By breaking the UM-Google partnership down 
into its key justifications we can begin to see some of 
the various subtle and overt overlapping ways that 
values (library digitization is part of our DNA/ 
digitization is moral), power (UM-Google agreement 
reflected a strategy/pragmatic partnership/UM 
exceptionalism) and politics (digitization as copyright 
advocacy/first-mover advantage) played in HT’s 
origin story.  Once the decision to partnership with 
Google had been made, a new host of opportunities, 
challenges, and tensions emerged.  
 
4.2. Solving an Instrumental Problem 
 
Google scanned the bulk of UM’s library in a 
leased industrial facility on the outskirts of Ann 
Arbor.  Nearly all aspects of the scanning project — 
the precise location, the process, the technologies 
used — were kept strictly confidential even from key 
UM personnel. Google collected truckloads of books, 
drove them offsite for scanning, and returned them to 
the library in perfect order, ready for reshelving.  The 
average turnaround time for a given book was 
approximately one week and, at its height, Google 
scanned approximately 30,000 volumes from UM’s 
library each week.  As a point of reference, it took the 
most aggressive and technologically advanced library 
digitizers a decade to scan less than what Google was 
able to scan each week. 
 
4.2.1. The Initial DI As scans started flooding in, 
UM realized it needed a place to put them and so it 
funded and created an initial DI relatively quickly.  A 
senior information officer at UM called the resulting 
DI a “forcing function of the thing itself.”  Almost as 
quickly as it was created, participants became 
increasingly concerned that the DI did not provide 
adequate robust security assurances: 
Everyone knew that, to do it responsibly, there 
had to be a second instance located offsite so that 
problems that hit you aren’t likely to hit them. 
It was only after UM had its digital back-up copy 
of the library, and had built a DI to support it, that it 
realized it was technically and organizationally 
under-equipped to deal with the instrumental 
challenges raised by this new DI.  Recognizing that 
as more partners joined the MDP the need for a 
secure, trusted, digital repository would grow within 
the broader research library community, UM hoped it 
could leverage its initial DI to attract the partners it 
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needed to fund a much-needed second instance at 
another institution.   
A co-creator of HT realized early on that the 
optimal solution was a single high-quality DI, 
funded, supported and shared by additional library 
partners.  The lead architect of the UM-Google 
partnership and co-creator of HT reflected: 
The infrastructure had to be done right.  It had to 
be done in a way that people looked at it and said to 
themselves, ‘This is something we can’t not do, but 
we can’t afford to do it on our own and we don’t 
need to do it on our own.  We can partner with these 
guys and it will get taken care of.’ If every institution 
tries to do their own version, it won’t be done well.  
But if we have a single infrastructure, we can do it at 
a high quality and we can afford to bring in other 
people.  Michigan is already supporting this thing 
quite well, we just need another instance somewhere 
else.   
A DI initially built to solve an instrumental need 
of a single institution was now being positions as a 
central node of a far more expansive, collaborative 
DI — a shared digital repository (“SDR”) — that 
would serve the common needs and interests of the 
library community. 
4.2.2. Values, Power & Politics in Creating the 
Second Instance UM turned first to its affiliates in 
the CIC for support in creating the newly 
reenvisioned SDR.  Reflecting on the social and 
political capital built up within the consortium, a 
senior information officer said, “We’re good at 
sharing with each other and building things together.  
We recognize the advantages of economies of scale.”  
The CIC seemed to be on board in principle but the 
creation of a SDR was not a high priority for its 
membership.  A senior administrator at UM recalled:  
There was no urgency within the CIC about this 
and, as a result, discussions about the creation of a 
CIC SDR were vague and moving quite slowly.  What 
would the shared digital repository be?  Would it be 
a CIC project?  Would it be a project of some 
university?  Were there other universities involved?  
Would it be a project of a consortium of universities?  
How are we going to determine the governance, write 
the bylaws, and so forth?   
A rift characterized by many involved in the 
negotiations as a “clash of cultures” began forming 
between technologists and librarians at the various 
CIC institutions.  From the librarians’ perspective, 
their hesitant, slow-moving, detail-oriented decision-
making process reflected a culture of collectivism 
and egalitarianism that was integral to the identity of 
librarians and which libraries had thrived upon for 
centuries.  The approach reflected a sense of the 
gravity of their professional responsibility and 
respect for the status of libraries and librarians in 
society as the trusted stewards of our shared cultural 
record.  From the technologists’ perspective, 
however, the librarians were “pecking this thing to 
death.”  A co-creator of HT who straddled the line 
between librarian and technologist referred to the 
CIC discussions as a “Zeno’s paradox” whereby the 
task of creating the SDR was being broken down into 
an infinite number of smaller tasks, effectively 
rendering completion of the ultimate goal impossible:   
We were 99% of the way there but the rest of the 
way was very clearly going to be something that we 
weren’t going to be able to accomplish because 
everybody was splitting that last 1%.  This was 
supposed to be the meeting where we made the final 
commitment!  Instead we had library directors 
saying, ‘Yeah, it seems kind of pricey, maybe we 
shouldn’t have two copies of this.  The redundancy 
thing gains us something but we can save money if 
we don’t do that.’  But we at Michigan had already 
committed to that path!  It was very clear to us that 
we needed to have two copies and a back-up to make 
it viable.   
UM needed the SDR to move forward but it did 
not have the necessary funding to do it on its own.  
The CIC had funds but was paralyzed by the details. 
Negotiations were stuck and participants at UM 
urgently believed they needed to find a way to move 
things forward.  
 
4.2.3. A Charmed Relationship Saves the SDR 
Less than twenty-four hours after negotiations stalled 
with the CIC, UM had its solution.  A senior 
administrator at UM reached out to a friend and CIO 
at Indiana University (“IU”) and, through a couple of 
brief phone calls over a matter of hours later, the two 
institutions had negotiated a deal to jointly fund the 
SDR.  The CIO at IU recalled:  
I got a call from the CIO of Michigan saying, 
‘Our Librarian is going to call you because the CIC 
librarians are really struggling to figure this out.’  
Then Michigan’s Librarian calls while I’m changing 
planes in Chicago.  He knew that I didn’t have a lot 
of time and he said: ‘The shared digital repository 
governance is fucked.  This is not going to happen.  I 
can find about $600,000 per year at Michigan.  Can 
Indiana find about $300,000 per year?  We’ll tell the 
CIC that we’re going to sort this thing out — we’ll be 
the operators of the shared digital repository and the 
CIC can be its first client.  And down the line, we’ll 
get this moved to something else, but this is the only 
way to get it done.’  I said, ‘Well, I’m very intrigued.  
Just let me consult my Librarian.  By the next 
morning my Librarian had gotten the $300,000 per 
year and I had squared things away with general 
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counsel.  By noon the next day, I called Michigan 
back and said ‘Indiana is in.’  
UM and IU would move forward with the SDR on 
their own without the rest of the CIC.  IU agreed 
without hesitation to defer to UM on all technical, 
administrative and other decisions related to the 
project.  As IU’s CIO recalled:    
I told my guys in research technologies, ‘Go do 
whatever Michigan wants.’  And they stood up and 
literally turned that thing on in 30 or 60 days.  And I 
have to credit the strength of Indiana University’s IT 
organization because that was a bit of a 
countercultural moment in higher education.  In 
higher education, even in administrative and staff 
positions, everybody gets a vote and everybody gets a 
say and you have to reach agreement on things.”      
Participants at UM and IU credited their “charmed 
relationship” for the quick decision-making around 
the SDR:  
The charmed relationship isn’t structural but 
personal.  We have a lot of personal connections of 
people who have confidence in each other and in 
creating good outcomes together.  We could jump out 
into the unknown, without everything figured out in 
advance, and trust that we would both make smart 
decisions and solve the obvious emergent problems 
together. 
Shared values, practices, political temperament, 
and attitudes toward the exercise of power 
contributed to the “charm.” In particular, participants 
cited: 
 Common organizational temperament: “Both 
institutions have people in key leadership 
positions who were more interested in making 
things happen.  Not just studying it, but making it 
happen.” 
 Close personal and professional bonds amongst 
senior administrators: “We are kindred spirits 
and we complement each other.”   
 Shared attitudes toward advocacy: “We share the 
sense that great public research universities 
have to act now or risk becoming less relevant.  
That is what drives us.”  
 History of successful collaborations including 
the Sakai learning management system that has 
been adopted by over 350 colleges and 
universities around the world: “Institutions feel 
like they have to be able to answer every possible 
foreseeable question before they take the first 
leap.  And so that reservoir of personal capital 
really helps a lot.”   
These and other factors enabled UM and IU to 
reach a near-frictionless agreement in the creation of 
a SDR, a second instance of the initial DI that would, 
in time, ultimately become HT. 
4.2.4. Dropping the SDR Bomb 
When UM and IU returned to the CIC the 
following day and announced their intention to create 
the SDR on their own, it sent shockwaves through the 
room.  One CIC participant recalled: 
Oh my God, one day, the CIC is going to do this 
and the next day, it’s just Michigan and Indiana.  You 
can imagine, I mean, whoa, that was like, ‘Hey, what 
happened here?!’  It was a bomb! 
Another CIC member reflected:   
Librarians have a very collectivist culture and for 
someone to break out and do something this way was 
not only debatable as a strategy, it violated cultural 
norms of how librarians tend to do things! And it 
violated the governance structure of the CIC! 
UM’s Librarian explained his role vis-à-vis the 
CIC in the following way:  
I was something of a bull in a china shop.  I 
hadn’t been a University Librarian for very long.  I 
didn’t know the secret handshakes.  I was a former 
Provost.  I think I was a suspicious character in the 
CIC and I think that actually served the whole project 
well.  I tried to be friendly, and we did give a lot, but 
I was unwilling to be hamstrung by the norm of 
unanimity that meant so much to my CIC colleagues. 
The UM librarian who made the actual 
announcement concerning the SDR at the CIC 
meeting recalled: 
I said, ‘Indiana and Michigan are going to cover 
the entire costs between the two institutions and if the 
CIC institutions want to come in now, they can be 
secondary partners and will pay for part but will not 
have a seat at the table in the same way.’  And there 
was a catastrophic falling out.  One of the library 
directors turned his back on the table.  Literally 
turned his back to me. Lots of people were very 
unhappy about it. 
Notwithstanding the fallout within the CIC 
resulting from the SDR announcement, UM and IU 
continued to push ahead with their plan.  Key 
participants from both institutions met in Indianapolis 
to discuss strategies for moving ahead with the 
shared DI.  Again, in almost frictionless decision-
making the group chose a name for the repository — 
“HathiTrust,” identified a strategy for getting buy-in 
from additional institutional partners, sketched out 
basic details for what the repository should look like 
and how it should operate, and agreed on which 
aspects of the project could be shelved until some 
future date … all in a day’s work. 
 
4.3. Creation and Launch of HathiTrust 
 
Now that the SDR solved the problem of the 
second instance of the initial DI, focus shifted toward 
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how UM and IU might navigate the organizational 
and institutional fallout and begin to build consensus 
and partnership once again around the DI.  A senior 
administrator at UM and co-creator of HT reflected 
that, once the instrument problem had been solved, 
My first reaction was ‘What will all of the people 
who were involved with this do?  Well, they’ll hate 
us.  They’ll hate Michigan.  Anybody we try to bring 
in will hate us because we’re so hegemonic.  So I 
wasn’t worried about the technical side.  Michigan 
and Indiana had that covered.  I was worried about 
the organizational side. 
One of the ways that UM and IU sought to diffuse 
some of the backlash was to assure the CIC that, if 
they decided to join they would be held out to the 
public as a founding member:  
We ultimately gave them a seat on the board and 
on the executive committee, and that turned into two 
seats in time.  So I think they’ve gotten everything 
they would have gotten, but the bomb was the thing 
that caused them to move forward. 
In addition to making amends with the CIC, UM 
began working on bringing in additional (non-CIC) 
partners.  The University of California (“UC”), in 
particular, was heavily pursued: 
We need to bring in the University of California 
because the CIC produces about 10% of the PhDs, 
and the University of California produces another 
10% of the PhDs.  If we’ve got 20% of PhD 
construction it will be very hard for the others not to 
join.  Once the two biggest institutionalized players 
are in, we’ll get there. 
 
4.3.1. Appealing to New Partners 
Gaining UC’s commitment proved to be a 
significant challenge.  UC and the California Digital 
Library (“CDL”) were global leaders in large-scale 
digitization.  They had a history of working with the 
Internet Archive and Open Content Alliance and 
partnering with members of industry including 
Microsoft, Yahoo!, the Sloan Foundation and others 
prior to joining Google’s MDP.  As a senior CDL 
administrator described, UC saw itself as “the 
intersection of the Venn diagram of digitization:”  
We had a great sense of the big picture, of what 
people were working on, how far they were, what 
kind of challenges they had, how they were thinking 
about access and preservation.  We really were in the 
center of the communication and social side of 
digitization efforts.  
UC’s institutional identity and self-positioning 
had a number of implications (positive and negative) 
with respect to the UMs initiative. Weighing in UM’s 
favor, the CDL had experienced frustration over the 
lack of organizational infrastructure on some of its 
prior collaborations: “We were accomplishing 
digitization but we were not accomplishing the 
infrastructural aspects the libraries needed.” UM and 
IU had a proven track record of successfully 
implementing collaborative and innovative projects. 
In addition, the CDL was concerned about a 
misalignment of values between the library 
community and private firms like Google, Microsoft, 
Yahoo! and others.  A CDL representative noted:  
The academy traditionally tries to solve problems 
like each one of us are an island but the digital favors 
scale.  Either we figure out how to create scale 
ourselves in ways that we can steer in our interest, 
and take some advantage of the economics of it, or 
others will create scale and they will manage it in 
ways that are not in our interest. 
The CDL saw value in building a DI by, for and 
of research libraries.  The SDR would preserve, 
organize, and manage the data in a way that was 
consistent with library values and practices. 
There were also a number of factors that weighed 
against the SDR from the perspective of UC and 
CDL.  UC had intended to develop its own DI and 
progress was well underway when it was asked to 
consider abandoning it in favor of UM’s which they 
viewed, unimpressed, as a regional CIC project.  In 
addition, the UC system is particularly large and 
particularly bureaucratic.  Reaching consensus 
among the twelve UC libraries, and between the 
libraries and Office of the President (UCOP), is 
perhaps even more daunting than reaching consensus 
among the CIC.  When the CDL eventually 
approached UC’s governing board advocating for UC 
to join the initiative, UC took no action. In the view 
key administrators at UM, the situation was getting 
dire: 
It was easy to get the CDL people to join because 
this was right up their bailiwick.  But it was clear to 
me from the start that this wasn’t going to go 
anywhere unless we got Berkeley and UCLA on 
board.  They are by far the biggest pieces of the UC 
system in terms of campuses and they have stopped 
things repeatedly in the past.  If Berkeley and UCLA 
gang up they are essentially invincible.  So, we didn’t 
necessarily need them to say, ‘We’re in.  We love it.’  
But we at least had to get them to say, ‘We won’t 
fight it.’  That took about a year. 
UC ultimately did decide to join and its rationale 
was twofold.  One justification was economic — it 
was far more cost effective to share a single DI than 
create and support its own.  A second justification 
dealt with salience and control. As UC sat on UM’s 
invitation word began to trickle out that something 
big (HT) was about to be announced.  If UC wanted 
the privileges afforded to founding members, i.e. 
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organizational power to shape HT, it had to join now.  
Again, UM essentially forced action with an implied 
ultimatum.  As described by a senior administrator:  
We are moving forward with or without you.  If 
you join us now, we’ll give you a seat at the table, but 
if you wait, you won’t get that level of status within 
the organization.  
As it did with the CIC, the bold exercise of power 
paid off in terms of positioning to DI to be a viable 
and robust offering for the research library 
community.  UC joined and UM was able to push the 
SDR through a stagnating decision-making process.  
The shorter-term instrumental and partnership 
problems had been solved.  Now its co-creators 
looked toward the long now of HT.  
For HathiTrust to succeed over the longer term, its 
progenitors recognized that UM could not operate the 
repository as a dictatorship but must cede control 
over to the collective.  As one of my participants 
described: 
The library community is very catty.  Because 
they’ve been deprived of power for so long they 
engage in horizontal violence at the local level.  So, 
the number one complaint would be that Michigan is 
doing this thing that really benefits us so that they 
can control us.  This was going to be a huge issue.  
And so we had to give HathiTrust over to the 
members of the community, so that they could settle 
upon what HathiTrust might become.  We couldn’t 
say ‘This is the direction it’s going to go’ because, 
even if we were right, it would be prima facie 
evidence that we were drunk with power, and mad, 
and taking them where they didn’t want to go.  We 
had a vision, which was that we really needed to 
back-up our digital scans, but the rest had to be 
settled by the library community. 
When HT was formally introduced to the public 
in the fall of 2008, it was announced as a SDR jointly 
founded by the 12-university consortium known as 
the CIC and the 11 libraries of the University of 
California system.  There was no specific mention of 
UM or IU beyond the fact that they were members of 
the CIC. UM’s institutional fingerprints were already 
fading from the HT creation story, enabling new 
meanings to emerge out of the new collective.  A UM 
librarian observed:  
When you’re at Michigan, you see what’s going 
on here.  It wasn’t until I was at a CIC meeting and 
saw people with HathiTrust stickers on their 
computers and heard them referring to HathiTrust as 
‘We’ rather than as ‘Michigan’ that I realized there 
was already this broad sense of collective action 
being expressed around HathiTrust.  It was really an 




HT’s dark history reveals the multiple, entangled, 
dynamic and sometimes unexpected ways that values, 
power, and politics shape and are shaped by the 
development of large-scale, collaborative digital 
infrastructures.  Although much of its early history 
was founded upon unilateral and bilateral power 
plays that stood in stark opposition to traditional 
library values, practices, and governance structures, 
these moves were critical to HT’s creation and fed 
into its success nearly a decade post-launch.  This 
history also has implications for libraries and digital 
infrastructure more generally.  HT’s emergence and 
evolution privileges institutional partners that possess 
certain traits (i.e. large federated research library with 
significant English-language print collection) and 
have access to certain resources (i.e. funding and 
high quality, reliable broadband Internet) while 
effectively excluding other kinds of participants (i.e. 
individuals, smaller municipal libraries, private 
firms), and other forms of participation (i.e. 
membership without contribution and contribution 
without membership).   
This descriptive account and analysis of a 
particular DI reveals some of the ways in which 
existing relationships and alliances, shared values and 
practices, organizational sensemaking and 
institutional structures may become inextricably 
bound up and entangled in DI development. The 
MDP enabled but did not lead to the HT we see today 
in a linear or deterministic sense.  Instead, HT 
became over time, taking form through a process of 
incremental steps, unanticipated challenges and 
responses to changing technical, social, and 
institutional conditions.  Values, power, and politics 
were implicated across a sensemaking and decision-
making spectrum that ranged from overt ultimatum to 
strategic nudge to passive self-exile.  Using 
descriptive retrospective accounts generated from 
participant interviews triangulated against a rich 
textual record this research contributes to a more 
complete picture of the ways values, social 
relationships, organizational strategy, and 
institutional politics influence digital infrastructure 
development.  In particular, it demonstrates the value 
in foregrounding and emphasizing some of the 
hidden, subtle and more nuanced ways that values, 
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